![]() However, it is also increasingly used by malicious actors – Proofpoint saw a 161 percent increase in threat actor use of the tool from 2019 to 2020. This aligns with observations from other security firms as more threat actors adopt hacking tools in their operations. In 2021, Cobalt Strike is appearing in Proofpoint threat data more frequently than ever. Cobalt Strike is a legitimate security tool used by penetration testers to emulate threat actor activity in a network. Cobalt Strike is currently used by more cybercrime and general commodity malware operators than APT and espionage threat actors.Threat actor use of Cobalt Strike increased 161 percent from 2019 to 2020 and remains a high-volume threat in 2021.Malicious use of Cobalt Strike in threat actor campaigns is increasing.That being said Havoc, Sliver, and Mythic can also teach you basic concepts.(Updated at the request of a third-party) Key Findings Tho Armitage (Mudge's first project and predecessor to Cobalt Strike) and Meterpreter would teach you the essential concepts that apply to the Cobalt Strike and also aren't bad choices. ![]() Which is older but prob still okay to learn with As he didnt like folks using backdoored copies from pirates. I was actually informed by my employers currently in the interview stage that Raphael Mudge wrote a post on how to crack CS. ![]() I've never used them thus far but with all such software you would have to have some concern that it hasn't been backdoored. There are cracked copies of Cobalt Strike floating around. No way was I paying the money for it either. I never got to use it before I got my job. Plus I know red tape and proxesess in gov doesn't make for exactly frictionless handling anyway lol. I can say I'm gov but yea many of those if we arent detected early (or they haven't been given an early alert) aren't super duper even aware we're on at times or we've been on and their stacks aren't certainly reactive or they get such a number of telemetry alerts from 10s of thousands of users that they have to figure how to handle or if they will. Though a lot of what you imply seems to be once your org realizes something is anomalous and insititutes an after-action response. I'm not sure on the Memory forensics and PE stuff at least for our as I believe one of our other devs customized it further using the Artifact Kit and I haven't reviewed it. CS still does some of this as its inevitable of course as I know such as the named pipes but named pipes literally used for everything even with benign proxess and it would be up to RT Lead to let us use matching opsec. What’s hard is getting on the same page with organizations, learning to speak the right language (risk measured in money), and communicating in those terms to earn the right buy-in from leaders so your security team can build integration / understanding with the other stakeholders in order to work with the rest of the org without absolute resistance at every step, and finally authority to put necessary controls in place. If you’re not working for a Fortune 500 (100?), you don’t have incredibly impressive security. Like, no disrespect toward blue teams but let’s be real. The reality is the EDRs and analysis red teams are up against is widely unimpressive. Are you using one of the more unusual tools for injecting CS beacons? There are a few very cool ones. Is CS still clearing the PE headers at runtime for its processes? That’s weird, I’d use a Sysinternals tool and dump memory, look for that. You guys can make it harder to detect, sure, but is CS still using named pipes to communicate laterally between beacons? Tools? I’ll just pull SMB logs from Zeek or a SIEM and find your weird named pipe activity. The series covers malleable C2 profiles in great detail.
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